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FOREWORD
One should empathize, if not sympathize, with N A T O
force planners. Since 1991, standing and mobil izat ion forces 
made available by nat ions to the A ll iance have been steadily 
reduced. This part icularly has been the case for land forces.
Equally impor tant have been the structures the A ll iance
has created into which national contr ibutions would fall on
deployment . M il i tary Committee (M C) 317, accepted by
nations in 1991, provides the framework by which the
Alliance organizes i ts forces.
However , the author of th is study argues that the
structures and envisaged deployment framework for land
forces are a hopeless muddle. While there are arguably
suff icient react ion forces to suppor t N A T O Minister ia l
Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would, and
i n deed h a v e ,  i n h i b i t ed t h e  e f f ic i en t  a n d  e f f ec t i v e
deployment of land forces in cr ises. More specifically, there
are insufficient deployable react ion headquarters, both at
the corps and component command leve l , tha t would
suppor t a commander of a N A T O Combined Joint Task
Force. And perhaps even more vexatious is the continued
existence of what has become atavist ic “pract ices” of nat ions 
that impede and inhibit the employment of mult inat ional
land forces by an A ll ied commander .
The author observes that the N A T O Force Structure
Review offers nations an oppor tunity to review these dated
structures, organizat ions, and pract ices. To be sure, he
argues, this, l i ke the Long-Term Study of which this current 
review is the third and final part , is l ikely to be prot racted
and difficult . A fter al l, the A ll iance finds i tself in this
situat ion by i ts own consensus of act ions and pol icies.
However , col lect ively, the A ll iance wil l soon have 10 years of 
exper ience deploying forces to international cr ises which
should have had a salutatory effect on the think ing of
planners and senior level officia ls as wel l. Since the Force
i i i
Structure Review is in i ts early stages, one hopes that this
monograph wil l be useful to those dealing with A ll iance
a ffairs, as the review deve lops. T he St ra tegic Studies
Insti tute is pleased to offer this repor t to bet ter inform those
with an interest in improving N A T O force structure.
D O U G L AS C . L O V E L A C E , JR .
Director
Strategic Studies Inst i tute 
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MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCES
AND THE NATO FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW
I t is becoming increasingly obvious to N A T O nations and 
A l l i a nce  of f ic i a ls t h a t  t he  m u l t i n a t ion a l  l a nd force
structures created since 1991 are not wel l-suited to meet
A ll ied strategy.1 Three major problems predominate. F irst ,
most exist ing mult inat ional land headquarters and forces
were created with a view toward A rt icle 5 missions (i.e.,
col lect ive self-defense) and, in thei r present configurat ion ,
a re u nsu i ted to u nde r t a ke ot he r  new missions, i .e . ,
non-A r t icle 5 (e.g., peace-suppor t opera t ions). Second ,
operat ing pract ices under which these headquarters are
cu r ren t ly “commanded” do not  a l low commande rs to
exercise the command author i t ies required to prepare thei r
forces for thei r stated missions in peacet ime, let alone
deploy them effect ively in cr isis and war . Third, there are
currently an insufficient number of react ion headquarters
and similar forces capable of suppor t ing the force structure
benchmarks established by Minister ial Guidance for force
planning.
In the fall of 1994, an impor tant init iat ive was launched
to begin the process of the A ll iance’s internal adaptat ion .
This effor t has become known as the Long-Term Study
(L-TS) of which the fi rst stage consisted of the review of the
guidance for the implementat ion of the A ll iance’s New
Strategic Concept (Mil i tary Commit tee—M C 400). M C
400/1 was endorsed in November 1995. 2 The second aspect
of the L-TS was the long and labor ious effor t to “reform” the
i n t eg r a t ed com m a n d s t r uc t u r e ,  w h ich  w as f i n a l l y
implemented on  September 1, 1999. 3 The third and final
aspect of this effor t to effect internal adaptat ion , the Force
S t r uc t u r e  R ev i ew ,  a i ms to  r ev i ew fo rce  s t r uc t u r e
requirements to suppor t the new command structure and
minister ial guidance for defense planning.
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This last review offers nat ions a unique oppor tunity to
address some of the issues that have led to the current
si t ua t ion where force st ruct u re and pract ices do not
adequate ly suppor t the “A l l iance’s St ra tegic Concept”
re leased a t  t he W ash ington Summi t i n A pr i l  1999 . 4
However , for the review to help solve the three problems
listed above, str ict parameters need to be established to
ensure that the review produces the results required to
realign mult inat ional headquarters and forces declared to
the a l l iance. I n th is respect , addressing the problems
uniquely associa ted with mult inat ional land headquarters
and declared forces needs to predominate. Land forces are
the most difficult to command in a mult inat ional set t ing
gi ven t he  requ i remen t  for  m u l t i n a t ion a l  l a nd force
commanders to exercise greater command author i ty over
the forces than is required for naval and air mult inat ional
forces.
Therefore, the A l l iance needs, for the f i rst t ime, to
establish new parameters under which mult inat ional land
headquarters and forces are organized, commanded, and
operated. I t is not sufficient to review only “forces and
headquar ters.” For wi thout an examinat ion of current
command pract ices (for want of a bet ter word), l i t t le in the
way of real reform can result . In consequence, a number of
impor tant quest ions need to be addressed.
1. What should be the basis of mission requirements for
mult inat ional land forces declared to the A ll iance?
2. Is there a level at which national contributions to a
mult inat ional land force produce diminishing operat ional
returns?
3. Do current nat ional pract ices for declar ing forces to
mult inat ional formations result in mismatches between
requirements and capabil i t ies?
4. Where should exist ing mult inat ional headquarters’
roles and missions be changed to improve the A ll iance’s
overall capabil i t ies to meet M inister ial Guidance?
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5. Should exist ing structures be rat ionalized to create a
leaner force structure that bet ter suppor ts A ll iance strategy 
and Minister ial Guidance?
Mission Requirements of Multinational Land
Forces.
N A T O does not suffer from a lack of mult inat ional land
headquar ters and format ions decla red to the A l l iance.
There are currently six mult inat ional corps (which includes
t h e  a m b iguousl y  dec l a r ed E U R O C O R P S) a n d fou r
mult inat ional divisions declared to N A T O . Added to this
bod y  is a n  eve r  g row i n g n u m be r  of  h e a dq u a r t e r s
established by nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP)
members (e.g., Mult inat ional Peace Force South E astern
E urope B rigade). However , the lat ter are predominantly
or iented to under take peace-suppor t operat ions, as opposed
to A rt icle 5 missions. Significantly, they are not declared to
the A ll iance, subject to the integrated defense planning
process, and therefore fall outside of the terms of reference
of the Force Structure Review.
A l l iance st ra tegy st rongly endorses the concept of
m u l t i n a t ion a l i t y .  T h a t  s a i d ,  t h e  e f f ec t i v e  u se  of
multinat ional land forces is fiendishly difficult to achieve as
po l i t ica l  sensi t i v i t ies ,  n a t ion a l  l a ws ,  a n d f i n a nc i a l
regulat ions impede grant ing an a l l ied commander the
com m a n d a u t ho r i t ies no r m a l l y  g i ven to a  n a t ion a l
commander .5 G iven the steep diminution in the size of
N A T O armies since the end of the Cold War , the A ll iance
now heavi ly depends upon the existence and effect ive
funct ioning of the headquarters, should i t ever deploy
forces. That said, the A ll iance should insist , at a minimum ,
that mult inat ional land headquarters and subordinated
forces are made capable of under tak ing the core mission of
the A ll iance, i.e., A rt icle 5 (col lect ive self-defense). One
recognizes that peace suppor t operat ions have taken on an
increasingly impor tant role in A ll iance defense planning
since the end of the Cold War and this venue offers a unique
3
oppor tunity to engage our partners in areas of mutual
benefi t . Nonetheless, headquarters and forces declared to
the A ll iance do not exist solely for the purpose of engaging in 
peace-suppor t operat ions, ei ther exclusive of i ts partners or
with them .6 
The Force Structure Review, therefore, should establish
the base l i ne requ i rement tha t a l l mul t ina t iona l l and
formations declared to the A ll iance must be capable of
conduct ing col lect ive defense missions. Any move away
from this standard might encourage nat ions to refocus thei r
a t tent ion and or ienta t ion away from the basis of the
A l l iance.7 Moreover , a headquar ters and subordinated
fo rces ca p ab le  of  con d uc t i ng co l lec t i ve  se l f-defense
operat ions should also be capable of carrying out peace
suppor t  ope r a t ions. T hus, t he assoc i a t ion of pa r t ne r
m u l t i n a t ion a l  h e a d q u a r t e r s  l i n k ed  to  e x i s t i n g
N A T O -dec l a r ed hea dq u a r te rs ,  w h i le  des i r a b le  a n d
wor thwhile from the long-term perspect ive of the A ll iance,
should not be a l lowed to in terfere wi th the i r pr imary
m iss ion  of  p rep a r i ng to con d uc t  co l lec t i ve  defense
operat ions. Partners should be encouraged to contr ibute,
but they should be seen str ict ly as complementing, vice in
l ieu of, forces declared for col lect ive defense.
What is the Lowest Appropriate Level
for Multinational Land Formations?
N ational land forces declared to the A ll iance range from
n a t ion a l corps (e .g . , I V  Ge r m a n Corps, Potsdam) to
companies contr ibuted to the Immediate React ion Force
(Land), an independent brigade-size formation (former ly
k now n  as A l l i ed  C om m a n d E u rope  [A C E ]  M ob i l e
Force—Land).8 Since one of the pr incipal object ives of the
All iance’s ra ison d’être is that nations declare forces to
members’ col lect ive self-defense, al l ied commanders are
i l l-posi t ioned to refuse na t ional decla ra t ions of forces,
i r respect ive of size. That said, sound mili tary judgment
must be proffered that explains to nat ions and A ll iance
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officia ls the simple fact that there are disadvantages to
having formations made up of too many small contr ibutions. 
The simple reason for this is that nat ions have yet to come to 
terms with the fact that mult inat ional land formations are,
by thei r very nature, less efficient and less effective than a 
similar pure nat ional formation . D ifferences in language,
weapon systems, organizat ion , logist ics, and procedures, al l 
h i n de r  t h e  ope r a t ion  of  m u l t i n a t ion a l  fo r m a t ions .
Compounding this t ruism is the added problem that the
procedures by which na t iona l a rmies a re decl a red to
multinat ional headquarters have not changed appreciably
since the Cold War when nat ions’ contr ibutions in the
Central Region were made at the nat ional corps level; i.e.,
self-contained organizat ions. Thus, the net t lesome issues of
command author i ty requirements of a mult inat ional force
commander , t ransfer of command author i ty from a national
to a l l ied commander , establishing logist ics and training
standards and prior i t ies, etc., have yet to be revisited in
depth since the wide-spread introduct ion of mult inat ional
forces in the Central Region . As a result , the A ll iance finds
i tse l f i n  t he si t u a t ion w he re i t  h as t r a nsfor med i ts
d i m i n ished l a n d fo rces i n  t he  C en t r a l  Region i n to
multinat ional formations that are largely unwieldy and
difficult to prepare for war in peacet ime and command in
war .9
Notw i thstanding these l imi ta t ions, t he A l l i ance is
hardly in the posit ion to refuse forces declared by nations for 
col lect ive self-defense. Nonetheless, the A ll iance should
establish more str ict guidel ines and measures that ensure
declared forces are capable of contr ibuting to the A ll iance’s
common object ives. In this respect , the suitable depth of
multinat ional formations should be determined by a ser ies
of influencing factors, as opposed to arbit rary standards
nations are l i kely to oppose. The factors that determine the
smallest size of a land force contribution to a mult inat ional
land formation are: (1) size of declared unit , and (2) the
command author i t ies granted by nat ions to the mult i-
nat ional force commander .
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Apropos the question of establishing a threshold for the
minimum effect ive size of a force, the minimum size of
suitable forces declared to the A ll iance should be, in large
part , a funct ion of thei r intended mission , and related
readiness levels. Thus, the pol i t ical value of a nat ional
contr ibution to an Immediate React ion Force (3-7 days
readiness), no matter how “small,” should be an overr iding
concern , while mobil izat ion forces can be expected to be
con t r ibu ted in l a rger forma t ions. A  proposed gener ic
minimum standard might be:
1. Immediate React ion Forces: select platoons, company
and battalion;
2. Rapid React ion Forces: independent brigades with
organic logist ics;
3. Main Defense: divisions with corps combat suppor t
and combat service suppor t; and,
4. Augmentat ion: divisions and corps.
Command Authorities.
The delegation of command author i t ies to mult inat ional
land force commanders remains one of the least developed
areas of A ll iance force employment pol icy (see Table 1).
N ations have been loath to give up command author i t ies
over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that , inter 
a l i a , they wil l be “fragmented” or improper ly commanded.
Ye t , mu l t ina t iona l l and commande rs requ i re grea te r
command author i ty than they currently have over forces
due to the complex nature of land forces, as opposed to aer ial 
and nava l un i ts. More spec i f ica l ly , t he missions and
inherent operat ional l imitat ions of aircraft and ships are a
funct ion of thei r very design . Land forces, on the other hand, 
are combined-arms teams that need to be organized to
execute a mission . Thus, cross-assignment of forces (i.e.,
task-organizat ion), the need oftentimes to change missions
rapidly to respond to a deve loping si tua t ion , and the
legit imate need for a commander to establish logist ics
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prior i t ies are some of the more sensit ive issues nations are
reluctant to give up to an al l ied commander .
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1. Corps L A N D J U T /" M ul t inat ional O P C O N /O P C O M*(in 
   Corps Nor theast " war t ime 
2. I German/Nether lands Corps+ O P C O N (in peacet ime)#
O P C O M (when employed)
3. V U .S./German Corps O P C O N (in war t ime)
4. I I  German/U .S. Corps O P C O N (in war t ime)
5. A C E  Rapid React ion Corps
a . N at ional D ivisions O P C O N (in war t ime)
b. M ul t inat ional D ivision (Centra l)+ O P C O M >^
6. 1st U ni ted K ingdom A rmored D ivision O P C O N (in war t ime)
D anish In ternat ional Coordinat ing A uthor i ty
Mechanized B r igade (in peacet ime)
 
7. 3rd U ni ted K ingdom D ivision O P C O N (in war t ime)
I ta l ian A r iete Coordinat ing A uthor i ty
Mechanized B r igade (in peacet ime)
 
8. 3rd I ta l ian D ivision O P C O N (in war t ime)
Por tuguese I ndependent A i rborne Coordinat ing A uthor i ty
B r igade (in peacet ime)
 
9. E uropean Corps (E U R O C O RPS)+ O P C O M (when deployed)
10. E uropean Rapid Opera t ional Force O P C O N (when deployed)
(E U R O F O R)+
____________
* By agreement , Commander Corps L A N D J U T has O P C O N of forces 
under h is command. However , in exercises, i t has been the t radi t ion for
30 years for Commander Corps L A N D J U T to exercise O P C O M .
+ “Force A nswerable to the Western E uropean U nion (F A W E U ).”
# T he Corps Commander a lso now has “In tegrated D irect ing and
Control A uthor i ty . "  T his author i ty provides the Commander wi th powers 
that are ident ical or simi lar to those vested in a commander of a nat ional 
corps or wi th powers that are a l together new . Note that sovere ign r ights
(in the nar rowest sense) a re excepted. T hat sa id, the Corps Commander
has the r ight to give inst ruct ions to a l l subordinate mi l i ta ry and civ i l ian
personne l and may issue di rect ives to the binat ional and nat ional
e lements of the Corps and set pr ior i t ies. 
> M ul t ina t ional D ivision (Centra l) headquar ters is O P C O M to
Commander A RR C in peacet ime.
^ Assigned br igades are under O P C O N to Commander A RR C in
peacet ime.
Table 1. Command  Autho r i t ies of  NATO  and
European Bi-/Multinational Formations.
The proper place to analyze which command author i t ies 
a mult inat ional force commander requires (employing the
methodology employed by the 1994/5 Central Region-Chiefs 
of  A r m y S t a f f  T a l ks [C R-C A S T ] Wor k i ng G roup on
Com m a nd A u t hor i t ies Requ i red by a  M u l t i n a t ion a l
Commander—the only methodology developed to date in
this area) is with the assigned mission and an examination
of  t he  m ission-essen t i a l  t asks (st a ted a nd i mp l ied)
therein .10 (See Table 2 for defini t ions of N A T O command
author i t ies.) E mploying the CR-C AST methodology results
in the fol lowing minimum requirements for a mult inat ional
corps commander .
1. A rt icle 5 col lect ive defense: operat ional command
(OPC O M).
2. Non-Art icle 5 peace-suppor t operat ions:
a . Peace enforcement: OPC O M ,
b. Confl ict prevention: operat ional control (OPC O N),
c. Peacemaking: OPC O N ,
d. Peacekeeping: OPC O N ,
e. H umanitar ian aid: OPC O N ,
f. Peace building: OPC O N .
The rat ionale for the requirement of a higher command
a u t hor i t y (O P C O M ) i n  co l lec t i ve defense a nd peace
en forcemen t is due to t he need to ca r ry ou t combat
operat ions (the most difficult and demanding) and for the
commander to be capable of protect ing the force. One should 
note that under current N A T O procedures, OPC O M cannot
be de legated by a St ra tegic Commander (he can only
delegate OPC O N), without prior pol i t ical approval by the
contr ibuting nation . 11
In sum , given that mult inat ional land forces declared to
the A l l iance must be capable of conduct ing A r t icle 5
col lect ive self-defense missions, i t is clear that the norm
govern ing the de lega t ion of command au thor i t y to a
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9Operational Command:
The author i ty granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to 
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to
retain or delegate operat ional and/or tact ical control as may be
deemed necessary. I t does not of i tself include responsibil i ty for
administrat ion or logist ics. May also be used to denote the forces
assigned to a commander . 01/08/74
Operational Control:
The author i ty delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so
that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually l imited by funct ion , t ime, or location; to deploy
units concerned, and to retain or assign tact ical control to those
units. I t does not include author i ty to assign separate employment
of components of the units concerned. Nei ther does i t , of i tself,
include administrat ive or logist ic control. 01/06/84
Tactical Command:
The author i ty delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces
under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned
by higher author i ty. 01/09/74
Tactical Control:
The detai led and, usually, local direct ion and control of movements
or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
01/11/80
Coordinating Authority (N .B : Not a command author i ty):
The author i ty granted to a commander or individual assigned
responsibi l i ty for coordina t ing speci f ic funct ions or act iv i t ies
involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or
more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the
author i ty to require consultat ion between the agencies involved or
thei r representat ives, but does not have the author i ty to compel
agreement . In case of disagreement between the agencies involved,
he should at tempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion . In
the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer
the matter to the appropriate author i ty. 01/07/85
Source: M C 57/3, Overa l l O rganization of the Integrated N A T O
Forces; and, A AP-6(U), N A T O G lossary of Terms and Defin it ions
(E ngl ish and F rench), January 1995.
Table 2.  Definition of NATO Command Authorities.
multinat ional force commander should be OPC O M (without 
caveats), vice OPC O N , with provision for revisions to the
def i n i t ion to i nc l ude new au thor i t ies ove r peace t ime
t raining prior i t ies and standards.
Multinational Practices Requiring Review.
Current A ll iance procedures and the condit ions under
which nat ions decla re forces and headquar ters to the
All iance have not changed substantively since the end of the 
Cold War , when mult inat ional land formations were the
ra re except ion . As a resu l t , a number of debi l i t a t ing
pract ices and condi t ions combine to ma ke successfu l
peacet ime planning challenging and wart ime operat ion
problematic.
An obvious weakness is the lack of sufficient Combat
Service Suppor t (CSS) capabil i t ies declared to formations.
With the sole exception of the A C E Rapid React ion Corps
a n d  M u l t i n a t ion a l  D i v i s ion  ( C e n t r a l ) ,  no  o t h e r
mult inat ional land headquarters has specific corps/division
comba t  se r v ice  su ppo r t  fo r m a t ions dec l a red to t he
headquar ters. G iven tha t logist ics remain a na t iona l
responsibil i ty (notwithstanding the effor ts of CR-C AST and
A l l i ed  C om m a n d e r  L a n d  F o r ces  C e n t r a l  E u rop e
[L A N D C E N T] to introduce concepts of mult inat ionali ty to
log is t ics) , 1 2  t h e  p r ac t ice  of  no t  dec l a r i n g spec i f ic
corps/division CSS formations l imits effect ive peacet ime
planning and, potential ly, wart ime operat ion . N ations have
had good reason not to declare specific CSS formations in
that they are often cross-assigned to other mult inat ional
formations, or are t reated as rare nat ional t reasures to be
parceled out grudgingly only when absolutely required. The
A ll iance needs to consider establ ishing minimum CSS
standards by which nations declare forces to mult inat ional
forma t ions. As the con f l ict  i n t he former Y ugoslav ia
demonstrates, combat forces without organic logist ics and
CSS are of l imited operat ional ut i l i ty to the A ll iance.
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Concern ing the issue of command au thor i t ies, the
min imum requ i remen ts for t he command au thor i t ies
required by a mult inat ional land force commander were
addressed in the previous sect ion . However , the Force
St r uc t u re Rev iew shou ld exa mine t he def i n i t ions of
comma nd a u t hor i t ies. T he fou r recogn ized comma nd
author i t ies (i.e., OPC O M , OPC O N , Tact ical Command, and
Tact ical Control) have not been revised since the end of the
Cold War .13 For example, two impor tant issues for the
success of a mult inat ional force are not covered by current
defini t ions. F irst , peacet ime t raining remains a nat ional,
vice A ll iance, responsibil i ty. A compromise solut ion would
be for the A ll iance to establish an agreed set of tasks,
condi t ions, a nd st a nda rds. T he M i l i t a r y Commi t tee ,
t herefore , shou ld di rect  t he deve lopmen t of a robust
“mission-essential task l ist” for land forces which could be
used by mu l t i na t iona l force commande rs to va l ida te
established training standards. 14
W h i le pe r h aps on ly app l icable to t he 1 G e r m a n /
N e t he r l ands Corps whe re deep in tegra t ion has been
est ab l ished as a n  essen t i a l  po l i t ica l  objec t i ve ,  t he
development by those two nat ions of “Integrated D irect ing
and Control Author i ty” may provide a useful example of
what can be accompl ished in th is a rea . T h is un ique
command au thor i t y prov ides the Corps Commanding
General with powers that are identical or similar to those
vested in a commander of a nat ional corps or with powers
that are a l together new. O f course, sovereign r ights (in the
nar rowest sense) a re excepted from the commander ’s
purview. That said, the Corps Commander has the r ight to
give instruct ions to al l subordinate mil i tary and civi l ian
personnel and may issue direct ives to the binat ional and
national elements of the Corps and set pr ior i t ies. 15
Second , c lose l y  re l a ted to t he  issue  of  com m a nd
author i t ies and training is the question of when do forces
“t ransfer” (“t ransfer of author i ty—T O A) from nations to a
mult inat ional land force commander? I t is unrealist ic to
assu me t h a t  n a t ions w i l l  su r rende r  t he ope r a t ion a l
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employment of thei r forces wel l before thei r deployment .
Indeed, greater clar i ty in doct r ine is needed as to when
forces should transfer to a mult inat ional force commander ,
i.e., pr ior to, or immediately upon , arr ival in the theatre of
ope r a t ions .  F r ic t ions be t w een  m u l t i n a t ion a l  fo rce
commanders and nat ions can be expected unti l such t ime
that impor tant issues l ike t raining prior i t ies and standards
are addressed. 
A final question rela tes to the lack of “interoperabil i ty” of 
m u l t i n a t ion a l l a nd headqu a r te rs. T he re rem a i ns no
s t a n d a r d  o r g a n i z a t ion a l  “ t em p l a t e”  to  w h ich  t h e
multinat ional land headquarters declared to the A ll iance
adhere. As demonstrated in the Stabil izat ion Force (S F OR)
expe r ience , t h ree N A T O d iv ision headqu a r te rs we re
deployed to the theater under the A ll ied Command E urope
Rapid React ion Corps (ARRC). These divisions included
subordinated forces with which these headquarters had had 
no peacet ime habitual t raining rela t ionships (to include
units from non-N A T O nations). Headquarters declared to
the A ll iance, therefore, should be required to adhere to a
number of basic standards, the bet ter to enable them to
integrate forces with which they do not have a peacet ime
planning and exercising rela t ionship.
1. Headquarters declared to N A T O should have N A T O
i n t e r n a t ion a l  l eg a l  pe r son a l i t y  to  f ac i l i t a t e  t h e i r
employment by the A ll iance. 16 The N A T O Status of Forces
Agreement should serve as the basis to govern the status of
foreign forces.
2. Headquarters declared to N A T O should adopt as a
minimum those procedures and pract ices established in
formal Mil i tary Committee guidance to N A T O Mili tary
A u t ho r i t i es ,  N A T O  S t a n d a r d i z a t ion  A g r e e m e n t s
(ST A N A GS), A ll ied Tact ical Publication 35 (Land Force
Tact ical Doct r ine), and the planning guidel ines emerging
from Bi-Major N A T O Command work ing groups suppor t ing 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJT F ) concept development;
e.g., “M N C ’s Guidel ines for Operat ional Planning (G OP).” 17
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3. Headquarters declared to N A T O must use E nglish as
the headquarters’ officia l language, with greater provision
for the use of F rench when requested.
Changing Roles and Missions of Existing
Headquarters and Forces.
M u l t i n a t ion a l  cor ps i n  t he  C en t r a l  Region we re
established in the early 1990s to provide nat ions the abil i ty
to operate competently within a corps structure, but with
smaller force structures. With the obvious exception of the
ARRC , a l l other mult inat ional corps have an A ll iance main
defense mission . Notwithstanding the fact that some have
the abil i ty to engage in peace-suppor t operat ions, the ARRC 
remains the A ll iance’s sole react ion corps. 
There are currently insufficient suitable headquarters
and forces capable of suppor t i ng t he force st r uct u re
benchma r ks est abl ished by M in iste r i a l G u idance for
defense planning. For example, the A ll iance has created
three Commander , Joint Task Force (CJT F )-designated
headqua r te rs (Regiona l Commande r  Nor t h , Regiona l
Com m a nde r  Sou t h ,  a nd Com m a nde r  S t r i k i ng F lee t
A t lantic). Addit ionally, guidance from ministers and the
Defense Review Committee hold that Strategic Command
E urope must be prepared to under take two non-Art icle 5
contingencies, as wel l as a col lect ive defense contingency. 18
Yet , the A ll iance has available for rapid react ion missions
only two land component commands to suppor t a CJT F , i.e.,
A C E Rapid React ion Corps and the Immediate React ion
F o rce- L a n d ( t h e  l a t e r  of  w h ich  is on l y  ca p a b le  of
commanding and control l ing a large br igade). For this
reason , the A ll iance has been forced to accept the use of the
E U R O C O RPS as a fol low-on headquar ters in Kosovo
(Kosovo Force—K F OR) 19 due to the lack of suitable react ion
headquarters declared to the A l l iance. Thus, there is a
need for addi t iona l mu l t ina t iona l l and headquar ters,
declared to the A ll iance, with a react ion focus, vice largely
less useful headquarters and forces with main defense
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missions. T he very lack of a ground component head-
quarters for the entire ground operat ion in Kosovo was
singled out by Commander-in-Chief, A ll ied Forces Southern 
E urope Admira l James E l l is as const i tu t ing a major
mistake in the conduct of the campaign against Serbia in
1999.20
Six points should guide the designation and creation of
new react ion corps headquarters.
1. There are exist ing corps-size mult inat ional main
defense headqu a r te rs t h a t  cou ld be redesign a ted to
command react ion forces.
2. There are sufficient react ion force divisions declared
to the A l l iance genera l ly to mee t cur rent M in ister ia l
Guidance 1999 requirements.
3. React ion force divisions and corps CSS should be
declared to newly designed react ion corps headquarters to
ensure the development of habitual work ing relat ionships.
4 .  E f for ts to c rea te  ef fec t i ve  m u l t i n a t ion a l  l a n d
formations heretofore have been almost exclusively l imited
to Region Nor th armies. The Force Structure Review offers
nations the oppor tunity to establish potential ly similar
st ructures that offer many non-defense advantages in
Region Sou t h . Region Nor t h n a t ions a nd a r mies, i n
part icular , should part icipate more act ively in a Region
South react ion force headquarters and to declare react ion
forces and corps CSS in order to br ing thei r technological
exper t ise and to contr ibute to establishing a conducive
work ing and operat ing environment .
5. The designation of cer tain headquarters as “l ight” and
“hea v y” o r ien ted wou ld resu l t  i n  l i m i t i ng A l l i a nce
deployment options as opposed to increasing them . React ion 
force headquarters, perforce, must be capable of operat ing
within the full spect rum of missions and condit ions.
6. F inally, and perhaps most impor tant ly, any new
react ion force headquarters must adhere to the pr inciples of
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multinat ionali ty outlined above in order to be capable of
integrating subordinated forces and serving effect ively as a
C J T F ’s mult inat ional land component command head-
quarters.
The A ll iance should consider a mult ifaceted approach to
mee t ing the requi rement for an increased number of
headquar ters capable of serving as a land component
headquarters under a CJT F . Major pol i t ical decisions need
to be made by nations and financia l resources committed to
this object ive if the A ll iance is to achieve this ambit ious
goal.
Options for Reform.
A C E  R ap i d React ion Corps (A R R C).21 T he A R R C
(Mönchengladbach) has a proven record as a mult inat ional
react ion force headquarters (Implementat ion Force [I F OR]
and K F OR operat ions) and is the only one with declared
corps CSS. That i t remains largely B rit ish-dominated (60
percen t of t he headquar ters is B r i t ish) is a pol i t ica l
weakness that can be overcome by an increase in other
cor ps-si zed reac t ion force  headqu a r te rs .  T h a t  sa id ,
addit ional react ion force corps, perforce, should draw upon
the current unwieldy 11 divisions declared to i t since i t is
only capable of commanding four divisions.
V U S / I I German Corps. The U .S. A rmy in E urope is the
best prepared to conduct react ion force missions in E urope.
However , i ts corps headquarters, being national, would
require the most internal reform . Currently, in wart ime, V
U S Corps (He ide lberg) has a wart ime ar rangement to
cross-assign divisions with I I G E  Corps (U lm). The A ll iance
would be very wel l-served indeed if V US and I I G E  Corps
were merged, with the U nited States as the lead nation , and
transformed into an A ll iance react ion force headquarters
with internat ional personali ty. D ivisions currently declared 
to the ARRC could be reassigned to the new corps. 22 
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1 German / Nether lands Corps. This formation (based in
Münster) was init ia l ly designed for main defense missions
and, in effect , to merge the two armies. However , the Royal
Nether lands A rmy is undergoing a signif icant restruc-
turing and reorganizat ion , the bet ter to enable i t to engage
in power-project ion missions. The German A rmy has also
made progress in creat ing cr isis react ion forces. Both
n a t ion s s hou l d  s t ron g l y  con s i d e r  r eo r i en t i n g t h e
headqua r ters pr imar i ly toward a react ion force . T he
headquarters’s strong adherence to N A T O standards and
the use of E nglish make i t a highly suitable headquarters.
Divisions declared to the ARRC could be reassigned to give
i t greater force structure depth . To be sure, i t would be
unique in that i t would not be a lead nation formation , but
rather bi-nat ional. 
E U R O C O R P S . Because t h is forma t ion ( loca ted in
S t r a sbou r g )  i n c l u d es t h e  F r e n ch  A r m y ,  i t  of f e r s
conside r able ope r a t iona l advan tages to t he A l l i ance ,
espec i a l l y  g i v en  F r a nce ’s ex t ens i v e  ex pe r i ence  i n
power-project ion . However , the F rench A rmy remains
equa l ly un fami l i a r w i th basic N A T O procedures. A n
example of i ts heretofore “distant” rela t ionship with N A T O
is that only as of September 1, 1999, was E nglish made the
operat ional language of the headquarters. Moreover , the
corps is mult i-roled, is not combat ready for use as a react ion 
force, and enjoys, at best , an ambiguous rela t ionship with
the A ll iance.23 The nat ions part icipat ing in this formation
could make a major contribution to the A ll iance if they were
to: (1) clearly declare the headquarters to the A ll iance, (2)
reorga n i ze t he headqu a r te rs to adhe re to st a nda rds
outl ined above, and (3) adopt , unambiguously, a react ion
force mission and or ientat ion .
Probably the A l l iance’s biggest challenge is to establish a 
r eac t ion  fo rce  hea dq u a r te rs t h a t  fos te rs i m p roved
interoperabil i ty among Region South armies. T radit ionally, 
the armies of this region have had l imited oppor tunity to
work together in a peacet ime mult inat ional set t ing, let
alone on deployment . And, indeed, the decision by the
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A ll iance not to create land component commanders in
Regions Nor th and South (whereas there are air and sea
component commanders) places obstacles in the path of
improving this situat ion . As a result , there wil l not be a
sui table land-focused headquar ters act ing to in tegrate
armies during peacet ime, let alone providing a capabil i ty to
the A ll iance to act as a land component command under a
CJT F . Nonetheless, at the level of forces and headquarters,
the A ll iance can work to overcome this current lack of
multinat ionali ty. The most obvious option relates to the
E u rope a n  R a p i d  O pe r a t ion a l  F o rce  ( E U R O F O R—
F lorence), a d iv ision-size headqua r ters cur ren t ly not
declared to the A ll iance. Part icipants include I taly, F rance,
Spain , and Por tugal. As is the case with the E U RO C ORPS,
the cur rent sta tus of E U R O F O R cont r ibu tes l i t t le to
A l l i ance p repa ra t ions and p lann ing, a l t hough i t  has
potent ia l . Be ing in I t a ly , i t  is loca ted in the cent ra l
M ed i t e r r a n e a n  a n d  en joys mode r n  a n d  e x t ens i v e
infrastructure. G reece and Turkey should be encouraged to
declare react ion forces to i t . The headquarters should: (1) be
expanded eventually to the size of a corps staff, (2) be
declared to the A ll iance, (3) be reorganized to adhere to
standards for headquarters outlined above, (4) assign Nor th 
A m e r ica n  a n d  R eg ion  N o r t h  s t a f f  of f ice r s to  t h e
headquarters, and, in t ime, (5) declare to i t Nor th Amer ican
and Region Nor th forces.
Rationalization of Headquarters?
The above analysis intentionally did not address the
suitabil i ty of Mult inat ional Corps Nor th E ast (Stet t in) and
I V G E Corps (Potsdam). There is mer i t in maintaining a
number of mult inat ional corps with largely a main defense
or ientat ion . However , those formations that retain this
m ission-or ien t a t ion wou ld con t r ibu te  grea t l y to t he
All iance’s main defense capabil i t ies by invit ing the armies
of the new members to declare forces to the formations and
par t icipate in the headquar ters’ staffs. O ther A l l iance
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membe rs shou ld second st a f f  of f ice rs a lso to t hese
formations and contr ibute to thei r operat ion .
The Way Ahead.
N ations face considerable challenges in reforming the
st ructures and pract ices regula t ing the opera t ion and
command of mult inat ional land headquarters. The Force
Structure Review offers a unique oppor tunity for nat ions to
reexamine these problems and l acunae in stated A ll iance
strategy and Minister ial Guidance on the one hand and
current structures and capabil i t ies on the other . On the
negative side of the task , nat ions have t radit ionally been
reluctant to offer up land forces to foreign commanders and
national laws make a mult inat ional land force commander’s 
influence over such issues as logist ics, challenging at best .
However , on the posit ive side, there is l i t t le need for nat ions
to create new forces and headquarters. Rather , they need to
reexamine the missions of current exist ing headquarters.
That said, let there be no doubt that without a fresh review
of the pract ices and author i t ies under which mult inat ional
land force commanders currently command thei r forces, a
mere redesignation of headquarters’ missions wil l be for
naught .
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